On Causation: confronting the problem of induction

1) All animals seem to function on the assumption that the future will be like the past. Otherwise, the uncertainty which would ensue would hinder the survival of even the most capable of animals. The rational animal has developed a magnificent theory which accounts for this phenomenon; namely, the theory of causation.
2) Causation is the theory that all events in the world are the result of some cause. Insofar as the same causes are in place, the effects will necessarily be exactly the same. Determining which causes are responsible for which effects is the occupation of science. This is achieved through experimentation, so as to isolate particular causes and their effects.
3) Since every event must have a prior cause, which itself must be caused, and so on ad infinitum, the chain of causes must have commenced with a first cause, which itself is uncaused. This idea lies at the heart of religious philosophy, in which God is ambiguously taken to be the uncaused first cause.
4) The apparent success of this theory has allowed it to remain virtually unchallenged for centuries.  Eventually, the keen eye of philosophy turned its attention to this fundamental, and it was immediately revealed to be groundless and wholly speculative. I am referring, of course, to the works of David Hume in the eighteenth century, particularly An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume simply asked, what informs us of this connection between two events? Can the two events not be distinct and unrelated, each occurring uncaused, as a matter of fact? This is known as the problem of induction.
5) Intuitively this seems wrong. The fact that events have always conjoined in this way (at least so far as we know) indicates this phenomenon. Why else would two events always succeed each other so precisely?
6) However, this begs the question and does not remove it. For if there is no inherent connection between two events, there is no ‘why’ question which is valid. If it is merely a matter of fact, on what basis can one ask ‘why’ the fact is this way, and no other? Only upon assuming a worldview of causation can questions of the ‘why’ sort have validity.
7) This is the failure of the axiomatic question (commonly posed by theists) as to why there exists something rather than nothing. Such a question assumes that there is a ‘why’ for the existence of reality, but this is a baseless assumption. In fact, even if causation is a viable thesis, this only tells us that in the world events function this way, but the existence of a world which functions this way in the first place cannot be restricted by the contingent mechanism of the world, since these limitations only exist if the world exists. Moreover, assuming this world encompasses all of reality, the existence of this world cannot be dependent on anything, including causation, for without the world there is nothing which can contain and dictate such limitations.    
6) No occurrence in nature can disprove causation, but can only disprove our understanding of particular causes. Indeed, similar events in nature are constantly succeeded by slightly or entirely different events, but this does not represent a problem for the believer in causation. If a different succession has been obtained it is determined that there is some difference between the two prior events, which is the reason for the differentiation.
7) Given certain occurrences, the laws of nature, which are generalizations of induced causes, may have to be rewritten; but the assumption that there are laws still holds, because anything which occurs is necessarily a part of nature, and so must be included in, and accounted by, the generalizations of nature. This is often overlooked by religious laymen who see in supposed miracles a proof for the existence and authority of God. What, though, is a miracle, if not an event in nature? Even assuming any such event has occurred, it can reveal nothing more than the necessity to revise our current generalizations of nature.
8) So it must be granted that empirical observation cannot confirm or deny that events are caused. Immanuel Kant explored an entirely different path to account for this precious belief of ours. He postulated that causation is not known to us through experience, but is known a priori as a given. Experience determines how we are to assign the presumed causes, but does not, and cannot, create the need for such assignment.
9) Kant was thereby attempting to restore security in this conviction, but this theory mostly serves to increase doubt in causation. After all, a priori reasoning isn't something demonstrable, and can therefore be wrong. Later academics, following the prevalent trend of accounting for everything in terms of its survival-merit, have postulated that this belief arose because it allowed man (and other animals) to accurately predict future occurrences. Such an explanation may be helpful to scientists, but it leaves logicians embarrassed and unemployed.
10) Other explanations were theorized as well. Hume himself accounted for this belief rather radically. He argued that belief and imagination are of the same kind, different only in degree; belief arises when there is high expectation for a particular imaginary state. Given this supposition, he postulated that we believe the future will be like the past out of habit. Our brains, accustomed to seeing event B succeed event A, expect by force of habit that it will continuously be this way.
11) However, this explanation only accounts for the belief that the future will be like the past, but does not account for the belief in causation. Personally, I am inclined to believe that it arises due to the nature of our rational faculties. To say events are uncaused, that they are merely a matter of fact, does not explain the fact but insists that no such explanation exists. This does not satisfy our rational faculties, which desire an explanation, and so causation is theorized. Accordingly, it is not from the observed frequency of similar successions which forms our conviction in causation, for there is nothing in the repetition of similar events that is not in any one of those events, as Hume demonstrated; rather, any single event is deemed caused in effort to make sense of it.
12) Such a phenomenon is apparent from the argument theists are accustomed to hold concerning the existence of God, that postulating a God explains the existence of the world better than not postulating a God. Yet, the atheist position is not that the world can be explained without a God (that would be absurd), but that no such explanation is necessary! The onus is on the theist to demonstrate the need for an explanation. It seems obvious that such argumentation is the unfortunate result of our need for explanation, owing to our rational faculties, which desire explanation. Like a child who must know ‘why’ to everything told to him, the theist hangs onto God to satisfy his need for explanation.
13) Truthfully, any explanation here is unnecessary and contradictory. Unnecessary, because if events are not caused, the event of our believing in causation or the conformity of the future to the past can also be uncaused, and so does not require an explanation. Contradictory, because it purports to establish causes in order to maintain randomness. Apparently, Hume did not recognize the implications of his argument even while introducing it.
14) We do not believe in causation and therefore deduce that the future will be like the past, if anything, it is the belief that the future will be like the past which necessitates the belief in causation. This can easily be demonstrated. We believe that the world will continue to exist as it did in the past, despite atheists and theists alike not positing any necessary cause for the existence of reality. It is thus evident, that this belief is independent of the belief in causation; it is merely made coherent through it. Consequently, if we are to end this period of philosophical frustration which Hume has begun, we should not look in causation for our rationale, since it is not causation which is the source of this belief.
15) How is it that any belief can ever be justified? Even assuming heaps of evidence and sound argument, it is possible that there is something we are unaware of which accounts for the evidence and arguments we may have. After all, we cannot disprove that which we are unaware of, and we cannot prove that we are ever sufficiently aware to make claims.
16) We mustn't consider such objections to our beliefs, because beliefs are established through judgment, which is a subjective act based on our perspective. Beliefs are justified so long as they concur with the knowledge available to us, because beliefs are this subjective judgment. Nonetheless, this is a strong objection to knowledge, as it makes us aware of our indispensable fallibility.
17) When we observe the succession of events A and B, and then inquire what would happen if we were to repeat event A, we believe event B will follow because this is the only knowledge available to us. To entertain the notion that event A might be followed by event C is to entertain the notion that something new would exist, namely event C, which as of yet we have no knowledge of. Even if event C consists of nothing but the lack of event B, that as well is a state of affairs which we have no knowledge of its existence. Therefore, we judge based on the knowledge available that event B will follow, as opposed to event C. This is the source for the belief that the future will be like the past, and is its rationale; the future is determined to be like the past because to say it will be different than the past is to posit the existence of that which we have no right to posit. With this simple idea I believe the problem of induction is solved.
18) No doubt one will object to this, that the repetition of event A is not the same as the previous event A, so what will follow thereafter cannot be learnt from the previous event A. Any repetition of event A is actually a new event D, so no knowledge of what followed A can be of any assistance. At first glance, this is a strong objection.
19) However, to say that a repetition of event A is not the same as the previous event A, but is rather a new event D, is itself an invalid assumption: because until the existence of event D is known, we cannot rationally assume that this is a new event D, rather we must assume that this is but event A again. The fact that it consists of different matter and occupies a separate time and space is not reason to conclude that this is a new event D, after all, it can still be event A, but a different manifestation of it! This is not to say that by witnessing the repetition of event A we do not learn of anything new, we certainly do. Nevertheless, nothing which we can learn in this new occurrence can show us that this is not event A, but an entirely new event D.
20) The probability of an event X as opposed to an event Y is found in the results obtained in similar conditions. In any particular event probability does not exist, it either is X or Y. This is obvious if we define probability as measuring the actual results of similar events, as many philosophers do. However, it is also true if we define probability as measuring the propensity of the conditions to produce those results, as some philosophers do. Even propensity-theorists refer to different events to find probability; they only add that the actual occurrence of those events is irrelevant, probability according to them is based on the physical conditions responsible for those results.
21) If probability only informs us of different events, as we just established, how can we use it to inform us of the result of a particular event? A particular event in the series can either be X or Y, how does the knowledge of other events inform us anything about a particular event? Yet, we constantly use probability to determine the likelihood of an event, this assumption is fundamental for much of our knowledge.
22) The concept of probability is generally understood to be intimately connected with the concept of causation. If events were random or uncaused probability wouldn't be measuring anything, and past results wouldn't tell us anything about the future. Unfortunately, this conception of probability makes it even more difficult to understand our rationale in using probability. Take for example the probability of a coin-toss landing heads or tails. Now, if everything is determined that means every time a coin lands heads or tails it is because of some particular cause applicable only to that case- so how can we measure probability if every case is unique? The outcome of any coin-toss depends on particular predetermined factors unique to that coin-toss; on what basis can we measure the probability of coin-tosses in general?
21) According to the above explanation of induction, we can account for probability as well, without appealing to causation. Probability arises when we have observed different successions of an event A, sometimes B and sometimes C. Thus, when faced with the repetition of event A we use the knowledge available, that X amount of times it was succeeded by event B, and Y amount of times it was succeeded by event C to determine that for this repetition of event A there is X probability that B will occur, and Y probability that C will occur. To propose any differently is to propose the existence of that which we don’t know exists, when we can instead account for this succession with what we already know exists, which is an unjustified proposal. For this reason we use probability despite it only informing us of other events, for these events are assumed to be related so long as their distinctness isn't established.
22) Occam’s razor, the principle in logic which states that when faced with competing hypotheses one should prefer the simplest one, meaning the one involving least assumptions, is based on the above expressed idea of unwarranted assumptions. If a simple explanation accounts for phenomena, then a more complex explanation, which grants more assumptions, is unwarranted and groundless, albeit theoretically possible. In order for a hypothesis to be justified, it must follow from the knowledge available to us alone.
23) With this we can turn to the justification of positing causation, for as of yet we have only justified the belief in the conformity of the future to the past. Causation is the theory of events which grants the least assumptions, and is therefore assumed. To posit that events are uncaused is to make every event distinct and unrelated, each occurring as its own reality, whereas, to posit that events are caused is to make numerous events related, each occurring as an expression of one reality, namely, the cause. Thus, this assumption is justified because of its simplicity.  

Could miracles prove anything other than our own ignorance?

The classical rationale of Jews for belief in God and the divinity of the Torah are the miracles allegedly performed by God witnessed by multitudes. In fact, the Torah itself beckons the Jewish people to accept Gods existence on this basis. Of course, to prove the validity of Judaism on this account requires demonstrating that these miracles did indeed occur; this is an entirely different subject and is not the focus of this post. This post instead challenges the validity of accepting God or Torah on the basis of miracles, assuming the miracles as prescribed in the Torah did occur.

It is generally accepted that if miracles did occur this is testimony to Gods existence, His ability to interact with the world, and His control over nature.

However, to prove the divinity of the Torah, or the veracity of biblical prophecy, from the miracles of the exodus is unwarranted speculation. For even if it be granted that the exodus occurred and that it was intentional acts by a supreme being, how do we know the Torah is not a fabrication of say, Moses, as opposed to the word of God. Even if we grant that there was a heavenly voice heard on Sinai, we cannot know its true meaning and purpose. Any deduction here is pure speculation. As we are talking about a supreme being totally unknown to us, any speculation concerning the intent of this being’s actions is unwarranted. 

Furthermore, it should be noted that even as far as proving God, at most it can perhaps be said that miracles prove some unknown thing can affect nature, its essence and extent of power remains completely mysterious. As such to use this argument to prove a personal God, an omnipotent God, and virtually any other theological claim, is unwarranted as well. 

However, the argument from miracles is illogical and flawed, even as far as proving the existence of some kind of unknown God. To use this argument to prove God it is necessary to presuppose that otherwise the miracle could not have occurred. The basis for this assumption is that in nature we don’t find these miracles. Yet this is only because we have never experienced such an event. However, insofar as the miracle did occur this demonstrates that in nature this event does occur, contrary to our previous knowledge of nature. Scientific explanations for the laws and behavior of nature may have to be rewritten, but being that this event occurred in our world this proves we had a faulty knowledge of nature. It is illogical to deduce from a miracle that nature is in everything but this one event, that this event is actually an act of God; this is flawed for the same reason it’s illogical to deduce such from any other event we witness in this world. Nature refers to anything that occurs in this world, so long as this occurred in the world this must be classified as nature. As obscure and unintelligible, marvelous and irregular, as a miracle may be, logically speaking it cannot prove anything more than another aspect of natural law, previously unknown. 

Perhaps one will counter that as this aspect of nature is, to us, not explainable it must be an act of God. This sort of argument is extremely flawed for we don’t know enough about nature, nor about the exact events of the supposed exodus story, to determine that no naturalistic explanation can be given. It should be mentioned as well, that such an argument can be used without miracles as well, for in the natural world there is much we don’t understand, one can turn to any one of these phenomena and deduce God. Of course, this would be extremely foolish, but my point is that miracles add nothing new to the question of Gods existence.

Even if one were to disagree with this, though I cannot imagine how, there is a further problem with the argument from miracles. For even if one is qualified in determining that this event cannot be explained via natural phenomenon, one can only determine that there is a second nature in this world, that the currently accepted and understood nature is but one code of reality, there exists along it an entirely different code. (Many polygamists have already claimed that there exists dual natures in the universe, the scientific understanding of the unity of the universe is primarily a result of the monotheistic worldview.) To insist that this is but an intentional act of God is unfair, a miracle simply reflects the existence of a second nature. A second nature is no more remarkable than the first, if the fact that such a nature exists is proof of God, then it is proven from the first nature as well. Miracles or second natures add nothing new.

Perhaps the argument is not from the fact that a miracle is supernatural, for this can only demonstrate new information concerning nature, or at best that a second nature exists. Perhaps the argument is instead from the fortuitous nature of the miracles, they aren’t mere supernatural events, rather they appear to be intended and purpose-driven. Accordingly the argument would actually be another case of the argument from design. The argument from design is much discussed; philosophical rebuttals to that argument (as opposed to scientific rebuttals such as Darwinian evolution) would apply to this as well.  

Man in the image of God or God in the image of man?

Immanuel Kant, who demonstrated the invalidity of popular proposed arguments for the existence of God, offered a novel explanation for mankind’s insistence on faith. He theorized that when one looks upon the universe one feels a sense of unity and a sensibility behind it all which leads to the concept of God.  As Albert Einstein would later proclaim, “that deep emotional conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible universe, forms my idea of God.” (Although Einstein preferred to leave it at that; he didn't see the need to posit the existence of some kind of superman.)

Kant further suggested that indeed there is a reasoning power behind it all, ourselves, and this is mistaken for an objective reality, viz. God. In an effort to make sense of the various phenomena we encounter we formulate an interpretation of reality, a world model if you will. Thus, when speculating upon the universe we feel that there is a uniting force and a sense of reason and inherent order behind it all.

Indeed, theology is a way of making sense of the universe, of giving it a sense of order; this is theologies essence and its attraction. The source of this need for order, in a universe which is, in Einstein’s words, incomprehensible, is best understood in terms of our own nature; our nature as rational beings and as Kant says the fact that we perceive the universe only through giving it a sense of order. To be conscious would be impossible if all phenomena were perceived as distinct and unrelated; our nature as conscious beings includes a perception and model of unity and sensibility.

That this is the foundation of faith is recognizable from the nature of the preposterous circular arguments suggested for proof of God’s existence. All arguments presuppose objective order to demonstrate God exists, although it is absurd to talk of order without already supposing that the universe was designed and created intentionally.

The teleological argument is most apparent of this, by insisting the universe is designed, and then proving a designer, despite the fact that it can only be considered objectively designed after it is established that there is a designer.

However, other arguments are guilty of this absurdity as well. The cosmological argument, for instance, presupposes that there is a rationale for the universe’s existence and thus concludes God exists, in a sense it presupposes God exists to demonstrate God exists. Even the purely conceptual ontological argument presupposes the inherent symmetry between our minds and reality.

The argument from desire (which argues that there is no desire without an actual object of that desire in existence, it further insists that every man desires God, as such He must actually exist) also presupposes the order and sensibility of the universe, by presupposing that every desire must have an end, to demonstrate that God exists.

It is therefore quite evident that the presupposed order of reality is given form through postulating the notion of God.

St. Augustine argued for God’s existence from the existence of absolute truths which he felt could only be understood in terms of God’s ideas. This is explicitly arguing from the sense of reason behind all things.

For Plato this sense of reason and order caused him to postulate his famous doctrine of the forms; for theologians this causes them to postulate the notion of God. For Kant this caused him to recognize the nature of the human mind.

Journey through Time: Polytheism to Monotheism to Atheism

Richard Dawkins, a fervent contemporary Atheist, quipped teasingly as follows. He said (wording my own) that originally people believed in multitudes of gods; as people progressed they evolved to recognize the fallacy of their misguided beliefs, and painfully began disbelieving in more and more gods. Today, we have narrowed it down to one. Alas, only one more god needs to be rejected and we would be entirely free of this primitive superstition!

Although his perspective is amusing, this is not a proper conceptual representation of the evolution of god(s). Monotheism and Atheism are not the result of simply disbelieving in gods. In fact, it is a great conceptual progression, worth meditating on, the progression of Polytheism to Monotheism to Atheism.

In early times people saw the world as wholly mysterious and divine; the world appeared to them to be full of gods. Further, they could only relate to things in terms of themselves and so assumed that things, specifically the powerful ones, were beings like themselves.

Monotheism wasn’t the result of viewing the gods as baseless and unnecessary, but the result of the contrary; an increased awareness of the mysterious and divine nature of the world led people to realize that the gods were inadequate explanations. The difference between Monotheism and Polytheism is not one of quantity but of quality, not one of degree but of type. Polytheism assumes the existence of gods in the world. Ultimately, however, the gods are a part of the world, as are all things. So Monotheism was born, preaching that the gods are not merely beings within the world but rather the entire universe, including even space and time, is nothing but the creation and continuous production of a god. The plurality of gods is a nuisance to such an understanding; when gods function within the world then just as the world contains many powers, so too the gods must be many, but when god is seen as being the cause and authority behind the world, as a far greater god which is omnipotent, there is only place for one perfect god.

Until Monotheism, when the world was thought to be subject to various gods, there was no belief in the symmetry and perfect unity of the world. Further, it was absurd to imagine natural explanation of phenomenon, the very concept of Naturalism was absurd; where would such power come from? Only a god was attributed with power. With the advent of Monotheism the world was seen as the production of one perfect god, as such unity was expected, and natural explanation, now having a god behind the structure, was to be expected. The world was gods designed machine, it would be reasonable to understand how that machine functions. As such, monotheism gave birth to modern science which relies heavily on both the belief in the unity of the world and the belief that the world is a machine which can be understood (notwithstanding confusion of QM). In a sense, Monotheism gave birth to Naturalism; Naturalism is the structure God has created and designed.

Eventually, as the machine was revealed to be more and more sufficient for accounting for the events in the world, people began to view God as superfluous, He was no longer needed for anything, the machine seemed to run great without His intervention, and people began to wonder why the wondrous machine needed a god behind it at all. As a result of Monotheism God emerged, not merely as a part of the world, but as its creator and master, as such he permeated all of existence. Since God came to be understood in terms of all of nature, people began to wonder why nature herself could not be god. Because god was everything and everywhere in the view of monotheism, there suddenly was no need for the actual god, it was redundant. Enter: Atheism. In a sense, then, Atheism is simply an abridged Monotheism.

Although I do agree with Dawkins that it’s high time we reject this primitive superstition… 

Ideas on the Ideas

Plato’s doctrine of the forms remains one of the most profound worldviews ever attained and created. Its practical acceptance has admittedly been small, however its grandeur and intellectual attraction has caused it to live on in the hearts if not minds of philosophers for centuries. Eventually, it fell to the iron grip of organized religion, translated by St. Augustine into a religious doctrine[1], and was thus stripped of its natural beauty and philosophical achievement.

The theory was born out of various philosophical difficulties which have been the cause of great controversy ever since. The most notable of difficulties influential and fundamental to the theory is known as the problem of universals. Universals are concepts that reflect not a specific object but an underlying universal prototype that has instances of particular expressions of it. For example, the concept man refers to no specific object but to a prototype which is reflected through all men. In a sense, all men are not man itself, but partake in the concept man. The problem with such phenomena is that the concept is valid despite its abstractness and lack of physical expression, which indicates the inadequacy of the physical universe alone to account for conceptual reality. Physical objects seem to be based on prototypes that are real and recognizable, existing on their own, and they seem to form and rationalize all of reality. In subsequent generations this would mostly be considered a psychological difficulty; however, to Plato our minds reflect absolute truth and objective rationality and so psychological explanations are necessarily inadequate[2].

Plato thus acknowledged that universals are actually real, existing as pure ideas, and that all of physical reality is expressions and instances of these ideas. A dual world was thus created and defined; the world of ideas, pure and eternal, and the world of physical expressions and instances of these ideas, ever-changing and mortal. The eyes are the sense for the physical reality, while the mind or intellectual soul is the sense with which we grasp intellectual reality[3].

Interestingly, Plato used this theory to refute Parmenides’s argument which philosophers had grappled with for years. Parmenides’s argument raises the following difficulty: to speak of something not in existence is senseless as there is nothing which is referred to. Thus, to speak of change, which includes speaking about that which went out of existence, is senseless. As such the concept change is meaningless and is invalid. Put short, the argument demonstrates that one cannot have a concept of nothingness, for there is nothing which it refers to, therefore all talk of nothingness is necessarily senseless. Plato replied based on his theory, that nothingness is indeed nothing in the physical universe, but remains an idea, which has existence and meaning forever beyond the physical universe[4].

Naturally, Plato occupied himself with discovering and perceiving the ultimate and eternal reality, the world of ideas. One of Plato’s important conclusions was that the idea of goodness is the light through which all other ideas are discernible. However, it remains unclear why he thought so. Perhaps his reasoning was as follows. All human knowledge is only understood subjectively, after all, the very act of understanding is subjective and personal. Also, one only understands for one’s particular purposes in that moment, consequentially, one is further prejudiced towards it. Therefore, we cannot properly access objective knowledge. Our personal minds are unable and unwilling to reach out objectively to grasp pure objectivity not having any personal meaning assigned to it. Therefore, it is only through the idea of goodness, which forms all values, and hence all meaning[5], that we can properly access objective knowledge. Through our subjective value assigned to it we can grasp it as subjective and personal knowledge. Indeed, it is the light which enables us to interpret and discern all other ideas.

We must ask ourselves, why do we so easily dismiss Plato’s proposition as philosophical fantasy?   Generally people believe their sensory input reflects an objective reality, despite the fact that all arguments for this belief are circular and no one has yet devised a sound argument demonstrating this. However, as this is accepted by virtually everyone, it seems inconsistent that the existence of the world of ideas is generally unaccepted. After all, in both cases we have information concerning objective reality that suddenly appears to us, why decide the visual information and perception reflects objective reality any less than ideological information and perception does? Ideas, too, are perceived by us as representing absolute truth and objective credulity, and so should be accepted as real and objective things.

Furthermore, modern quantum mechanics seems to provide adequate evidence for the truth of the doctrine of the forms. Quantum mechanics seems to indicate that the universe without an observer potentially exists as every possibility, but actually exists as none, until one observes. These terms however, of potential existence and the existence of numerous possibilities, cannot be understood as physical phenomena. Various theories have been introduced to explain this bizarre finding, each one more surprising and ludicrous than the next. Yet this seems to be quite obviously a demonstration of the existence of ideas; every possibility simultaneously exists as ideas. Through these ideas, a world of actual objects is continuously formed, and so whenever we observe we see a world of actual phenomena, but when we don’t observe we can recognize that in reality, the ‘real object’ is the idea of that object, not the object itself, and so exists in a set of infinite possibility. Somewhat randomly, different ideas are chosen to form changes in reality.

But we need not rest on the mysterious and obscure findings of quantum mechanics to gain modern support to this ancient view. In fact, the entire science demonstrates its truth. Science is founded on the assumption of natural law, a concept which requires explanation, and without the existence of forms is utterly senseless. What are, after all, the laws of nature? It seems this concept arose out of Christian scientists, specifically deists, who regarded the world as created and controlled by the dictations of God. However, this picture fails to explain and account for the laws, for it leaves open the question: how do God’s laws and desires affect the nature of reality? The most obvious explanation of contingent law’s and properties which control reality is that these laws aren’t actually laws but ideas, which the physical universe, being an expression of these ideas, abides to.

We live in a world which seems to be surrounded and defined by ideas. Mathematics, for example, defies explanation and philosophers have long wondered what exactly numbers, and all mathematical truths and principles, are. Yet again, the most obvious explanation is that these are ideas. Particularly, this accounts for the massive success of mathematics in terms of its explanatory power over physical phenomenon. This reflects the absolute submission of physical phenomenon to the ideas. Similarly, logical truths can be accounted for as ideas. Morality, as well, has no place in a world of physical objects and is indication of ideas existing beyond physical objects, defining and controlling the natural order. Perhaps ideas are the secret behind aesthetics, as well. A song, for example, which is a grouping of various tones and chords, somehow when put together in the ‘correct’ ways, sounds symmetrical and beautiful in a way that is forever beyond our psychological selves. We recognize good music to be on-tune and can even discern rules which define what constitutes as musical. These rules, utterly out of place in a physical universe, can best be described as ideas; music is an instantiation of ideas. 

Perhaps there is no physical universe, but it itself is an idea composed of ideas. After all, isn’t our perception of the physical universe itself nothing more than a very grand and detailed idea? Why don’t we naturally assume, then, that ideas are real, and the physical universe is but one of the mysterious ideas?

With the modern age came at last the advent of Atheism and the possibility for new sophisticated worldviews. The new god of the atheists is materialism, and they have caused much of the religious and spiritual psychic, fundamental to humans for centuries, to die out. However, let us not forget that we live in a mysterious world, and our eyes are only one sense. The most important sense is, of course, the mind, which discerns logical credulity, and analyzes and accounts for physical sensory information. When we use the mind to explain reality we are faced with a very different picture of reality; we see a very spiritual and intellectual one. Let us not forget about the most important sense of the body, and let us not forget that as much as science has shown us, the universe is prepared to show us much more, if we would only apply ourselves with an open mind and not be blinded by the baseless assumptions of science or religion.

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[1] St. Augustine preached that these ideas are God’s ideas and prototypes for the world. He thus maintained that through philosophical investigation one can enter God’s mind and perceive His underlying ideas of the world, a belief which has helped philosophy gain popularity in the Western Christian world.

[2] Similarly, Plato struggled to comprehend how one can make a mistake, for it seems impossible to understand something irrational, as such if one thinks s/he understands, s/he must actually understand. Again, today this is mostly understood as a psychological question, to Plato this is a philosophical one questioning the nature of rationality and the law of the excluded middle.

Another example is Plato’s conviction that if one understands properly why the good is good, he will necessarily choose the good, for everyone wants that which is best, and the good describes that which is best. Reality seems to disagree with Plato on this; Plato recognized this and was forced to explain the reality in a somewhat desperate and unlikely way because of his a priori reasoning. Here yet again, most would consider this a psychological phenomenon, but to Plato the mind is necessarily rational and objective.

It’s worth noting that Aristotle, who was amongst the founders of modern psychology, disagreed with Plato on this, and also disagreed on Plato’s insistence on the objectiveness of ideas.

[3] Plato himself didn’t view it this way; he thought one is born with all ideas already in place. He argued that otherwise one can’t be convinced of truth, for how does one know if something is true unless he has the information deep inside him already. For various reasons this was not included in the text.

[4] I have been bothered by a similar question to Parmenides’s argument, but one that I feel is more difficult to answer: how could there be truths about states of absolute nothingness, there is nothing to have truths about? Yet there certainly are such truths, such as the truth that it is indeed a state of nothingness. Possibly, an idea of nothingness explains why there are truths about it. Indeed, without the idea of nothingness as well, there would be no truths, but of course we don’t understand this for we have never imagined a true state of nothingness, for that is impossible, as Parmenides demonstrated.

[5] Although some philosophers would disapprove of such grouping, Plato would not be among them. He understood goodness as personal and profitable, as seen through his argument that if one understands properly the good he will doubtlessly do the good, as quoted in the previous footnote.

The Paradox of Faith and Reason

Throughout history theologians have preached two opposing doctrines simultaneously; faith on the one hand and reason on the other. Generally it is thought that this paradox is due to the inadequacy of reason alone to demonstrate the validity of dogma and the unworthiness of faith alone to cause rational beings to accept dogma, resulting in the collaboration of the two. However, faith is generally stressed on as the ultimate foundation of belief, while reason seems to be the business of the faithful, which indicates that the relationship between the two is more complex. Indeed, although theologians have always spoken of arguments and logic faith is still the word connoting belief in God. If the foundation of belief is indeed faith, then one wonders what the place of reason is.

Maimonides rules that to doubt God’s existence, even momentarily is an act of heresy. This leaves us wondering why it was that Maimonides occupied himself with demonstrating God’s existence using logical arguments, for surely Maimonides at the time of his inquiries didn't consider himself a heretic. Evidently then, he had already concluded that God exists. Why then, seek to prove God at all?

Further, Maimonides lists as a commandment belief in God. His contemporaries have attacked Maimonides on this that this is superfluous, for in order that a commandment have any meaning to someone he must already accept the commander as existent. One of the suggestions offered by Maimonides’ defenders is that Maimonides indicates that the commandment isn’t merely to believe, but rather to rationally prove one’s beliefs. This as well indicates that to Maimonides arguing for God’s existence is something to be done even after a conviction that God exists.

To understand this we must first familiarize ourselves with the general theme of Maimonides’ philosophy. The fundamental concept Maimonides stresses on is the incorporeal nature of God and the awareness that God can never be understood by material beings. As per this philosophy Maimonides puts the central focus of Judaism on the mind as opposed to physical actions for to Maimonides the physical bears no relation to the divine and the only possible way of attempting connection with the divine is through the mind. Thus reason becomes a central tool to connect with the divine. Arguments for God’s existence become a religious experience, a ritual of connection with the mystical.

In different extents this is apparent in various theological philosophies. The theologian is willing to reason upon his beliefs but only to an extent, and only when he stands with nothing to lose. This attitude seems quite unworthy of scholars. However, theists aren’t validating their beliefs, this they do on faith; rather they are associating in a ritual of logic. The only way one can connect with the divine is through reason, for the divine cannot be seen nor imagined; only the demonstration of the necessity of a first cause can be attained. 

Fated to Loneliness

We never experience the world itself; we represent it in our minds, and experience this representation. Thus, everything in our world’s is completely our own.

Relationships with other persons are not a relationship with them, for we don’t know them; they are but relationships with aspects of our mental pictures. In the same vain we have profound relationships with other aspects of our mental pictures, if only that aspect captures our attention. The powerful feeling of oneness in the universe, produced through meditation, is a radical example of such a relationship.

The implication of empathy, that we care for them, is obviously wrong, because we never know others, so we certainly don’t care for them. Empathy is but one scenario of self-caring. We care for others because the experiences associated with mental pictures of them form a crucial part of our own worlds.

Now that we have established the solitude of every man and his world, mans life is revealed to be utterly lonesome. Man constantly attempts to connect with objective reality through representation, but despite the effort, consciously, man knows only his own mind. Society reflects one aspect of man’s projections, the world another. The true place of man is in neither; it is in his own mind.

The desperate search for an internal companion, a real connection with another, has led western man to develop the concept of God, a loving being which permeates all of existence, including one’s own mind. The mind was said to be a soul, which in the deepest way is connected directly to God. Thus, man could finally rid himself of his loneliness. Eastern man has instead developed the concept of Spirits and doctrines of the underlying unity of the universe, stressing the unity of souls.

The truth-seeker, who refuses to participate in any of these popular childish fantasies, must face his inevitable loneliness. It is curious that man, who is only himself, is so unsatisfied with remaining himself. But this longing is necessary for our development and well-being, for it motivates us to constantly represent new phenomenon and learn new information about our supposed surroundings.